Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2014

In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in an attempt to force a regime change in Kyiv. There are many speculations on Russia’s motivation for the invasion, and while it may take a while for the truth to finally come out, it might be helpful to understand why Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. So let’s take a look at the key events that led up to the Russian invasion of Crimea and Donbas in 2014.

In 2004, Ukraine held a presidential election between two candidates: Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Vicktor Yushchenko was considered a pro-western candidate while Viktor Yanukovych was considered a pro-Russian one. Shortly before the election, Yushchenko was poisoned in an attempted assassination, which he was able to survive but his face was permanently disfigured. People believed that Yanukovych was responsible, either directly or indirectly, in the assassination attempt. But Yanukovych was never formally charged, and he snidely remarked that Yushchenko merely had a bad reaction to eating fish. The result from the first round of elections was inconclusive, so a run-off election was called. Yanukovych claimed victory in the run-off, but the exit polls showed Yushchenko as the winner. Many Ukrainians believed that something was very “fishy”, and staged massive protests across Ukraine demanding a second runoff election. These protests were called the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution was successful in squeezing out a second runoff election, and this time Yushchenko was declared as the winner, and Yanukovych admitted defeat in shame.

Viktor Yanukovych, having been accused of trying to poison his political opponent and rigging the results of the election, nevertheless remained one of the most popular politicians in Ukraine. Yanukovych came to political prominence in Donetsk, the eastern part of Ukraine that many are now familiar with, and he became governor of Donetsk in 1997. He was also appointed as prime minister in 2002, after which he decided to try his hand at becoming president. Yanukovych was the leader of a political party called the Party of Regions, which represented mostly eastern and southeastern provinces of Ukraine, heavily favoring pro-Russian policies. Yanukovych himself only spoke Russian when he first entered Ukrainian politics. 

After his defeat in the 2004 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych, and his Party of Regions, was able to secure victory in the parliamentary elections, and Yushchenko begrudgingly appointed Yanukovych as prime minister once again in 2006. However, he would quickly lose his prime minister-ship to Yulia Tymoshenko. Yanukovych and Tymoshenko already didn’t like each other, as Tymoshenko was a former ally to Yushchenko and was a major figure in the Orange Revolution against Yanukovych. Tymoshencko and Yanukovych would become bitter rivals and both would compete for the presidency in 2010.

Yanukovych won the presidency in 2010. While Tymoshenko alleged that the election was rigged, most observers concluded that Yanukovych won fairly this time. Yanukovych was now the president of Ukraine. He survived allegations of attempted assassination and election fraud, and now as President, he would have many difficult decisions ahead of him. 

Now, Yanukovych is commonly known to be a pro-Russian politician. Is that true? Well, one of the first things he did as president was to renew the lease for the Russian naval base in Sevastopol in the Crimea. The Russians had maintained a naval base in Crimea for about 300 years or so. When Ukraine became an independent sovereign state, the Russian state had to rely on leasing agreements to keep its naval presence on foreign soil. By 2010, many Ukrainians were opposed to renewing the lease, as Russians had used its naval capabilities in Crimea to support its invasion of Georgia in 2008. Yanukovych negotiated with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and renewed the lease in exchange for discounts on Russian energy imports. It appeared to be a confirmation for Yanukovych’s opponents that he would be staunchly pro-Russian. However, the truth is a little bit more complicated. 

The major policy decision resting on Yanukovych’s shoulders was whether to sign an association agreement with the EU. Signing an association agreement is one of the first concrete steps to becoming part of the European Union. It includes provisions primarily in trade, such as a Free Trade Agreement, promises to reduce or eliminate tariffs, and adopting EU standards in the economy and political institutions and so on. Why was Yanukovych, and the majority of the Ukrainian population, considering ascension into the EU? Because they believed joining the EU would grow the Ukrainian economy in the long term. There is also a cultural aspect to joining the EU. Over the years, the EU came to represent the European identity, which meant that if you are not part of the EU, you are not “truly European”. 

There were however, a few wrenches in the cogs, a couple of thorny issues to resolve before Yanukovych could sign the agreement. The first major problem is, of course, Russia. Now, the Russians really did not want Ukraine to sign the agreement because the Russians wanted Ukraine to join the Russian led economic group called the Customs Union, which included fellow pro-Russian states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. The Customs Union is, on the surface, similar to the EU in that it would regulate and manage favorable trading policies among the member states. Not as popular as the EU, nor as comprehensive, but nevertheless under the control of Russia, the Customs Union was to form the foundation for Russia’s eventual project of forming the Eurasian Economic Union. So, Russia wanted Ukraine to choose it over the EU. But it would take much convincing to turn Ukraine away from the EU. So how would Russia go about convincing Ukraine? How does the Russian state go about making new friends? With ever increasing hostility and threats of economic and political damage, of course. Russia was one of Ukraine’s biggest trading partners, so the Russians decided to take advantage of that and imposed what was effectively a trade embargo on Ukrainian exports, which the Russians called “a more thorough customs inspections process”. All of a sudden, key Ukrainian exports to Russia became subject to extensive and extremely time consuming inspections by Russian customs agents at the Russian border. Among the export products targeted were Ukrainian steel, meat, and chocolate, particularly chocolate made by the largest confectionery company in Ukraine called Roshen. Yanukovych did not like this.

In fact, the allegedly pro-Russian president Yanukovych was so pissed off at Russian threats and retaliation that in a meeting with the high ranking members of his party of regions, he dismissed calls to make concessions to Russia. He allegedly “cajoled and bullied” anyone who wanted to side with Russia, and said “Forget about it. Forever” to the idea of snuggling up to Russia. 

However, It was not easy for Yanukovych to forget about Russian economic retaliation forever, because it was starting to hurt the Ukrainian economy significantly. The lengthy customs inspections were costing Ukrainian businesses billions of US dollars, and while Ukraine filed a complaint to the WTO to resolve the issue, it would take months, if not years. All the while, the Ukrainian economy was racking up foreign debt, and the public was getting rowdy. Yanukovych would need one hell of a deal with the EU to make up for the losses. 

Yanukovych asked the EU to provide $160 billion US dollars over a 3 year period as financial support to cover  the costs of the damage Russians had already done and expected losses from future retaliations from Russia once Ukraine joins the EU. The Europeans rejected the offer, and promised only $839 million US dollars in return. This did not sit well with Yanukovych. Things got worse when the Europeans demanded that he pardon and release Yulia Tymoshenko. Yulia Tymoshenko, Yanuokvych’s primary opponent in the 2010 election, was charged and convicted of abuse of power in 2011. The Europeans believed that Tymoshenko’s conviction was unjust and politically charged, and so they refused to sign the agreement until Tymoshenko was freed. Now, Yanukovych was pissed at this request. Tymoshkenko was his arch nemesis, and it seemed like the negotiations were at an impasse.

In late 2013, Yanukovych was feeling the pressure from all sides. The Europeans were demanding the release of his enemy, the Russians were doing Russian things, and the Ukrainian public was demanding that he do something to fix the whole goddamn situation before Ukraine became bankrupt. Yanukovych was a man on the edge. 

Just before the proposed signing of the agreement with the EU, Yanukovych abruptly renounced his plans to join the EU and declared that Ukraine would receive financial aid from Russia, a move everyone saw as the total rejection of the EU for Russia. To many Ukrainians, and even members of his own cabinet, this was a slap in the face. The exact reasons for Yanukovych’s change of heart is still unclear, but we can only guesstimate that Yanukovych was worried about his reelection chances due to the faltering economy. The Russian pressure seemed to have worked out in the end. Or did it?

A quick side note: Yanukovych’s regime was corrupt AF. Yanukovych, along with his cronies and Ukrainian oligarchs supporting him, used their positions of power to make corrupt dealings, growing their own personal wealth at the expense of the public. Corruption has been one of the biggest problems in Ukrainian politics and society, and Yanukovych certainly did not make the situation better. 

The Ukrainian public had enough. They were tired of the corrupt Yanukovych regime and felt betrayed by his decision to align Ukraine with Russia instead of the EU, and people started to protest. The protests grew and grew, and Yanukovych responded in the worst possible way, by using heavy handed tactics to intimidate the crowd. Special police units called the Berkut were sent in, beating and abusing the protesters. And yet, the protests only intensified and grew. After months of fighting, Berkut snipers began to fire at the crowds, killing more than 88 unarmed civilians. The situation was getting out of hand. Yanukovych knew he had now lost control, and decided to get out of dodge. He hastily made his way out of Kyiv, making sure to shred and dump documents into a lake outside his residence, documents that detailed his corrupt dealings as president, and fled to Russia. 

For Medvedev and Putin, Yanukovych’s speedy exit from Ukraine was a political disaster of their own making. The Ukrainians were upset with Medvedev and Putin. Who knew bullying Ukraine to abandon a deal with the EU, a deal which most Ukrainians including Yanukovych wanted, would turn public sentiment against Russia? Not these two schmucks. The Ukrainians were so pissed off that the Ukrainian parliament, now with the new interim government, tried to remove Russian as an official language. The interim president vetoed the motion, but you can only imagine how angry they must have been. The real problem for Russia was that Ukrainians were seriously considering canceling the naval base lease in Crimea. Should that happen, Russia would have lost its key naval base for its entire Black Sea fleet, seriously damaging its military capabilities. Once again, much of the blame for Russia’s impending strategic disaster fell squarely on Russian shoulders. 

Instead of treating Ukraine as a valuable, long term strategic partner, which it obviously were, Russia voluntarily chose to use coercive methods, attempting to subjugate Ukraine like a vassal state. The Russians could have worked with Ukraine on equal footing, building trust and negotiating ways that could protect their long term interests in Ukraine without turning public sentiment against them. But, no. They did not do that. Because Medvedev and Putin had the social skills of a proud incel boy.

With Russia’s long term interests in Ukraine now under threat, what will Medvedev and Putin do? They decided to invade Crimea and incite a civil war in eastern Ukraine, which is what happened in 2014.